THE TREATY POWER AND CONGRESSIONAL
POWER IN CONFLICT:
CESSION OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY
IN THE CANAL ZONE TO PANAMA
Kenneth D. Merin*
On September 7, 1977, President Jimmy Carter and General
Omar Torrijos signed two treaties at the headquarters of the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C. 1 These instruments
provide for (1) transfer of control over the Panama Canal Zone to the
2
Republic of Panama, and (2) the permanent neutrality of that Zone.
The treaties have been widely praised and criticized for their politi3
cal, military, diplomatic, commercial, and economic content.
One interesting legal issue, however, has gone virtually unnoticed off of Capitol Hill. That question is: Does the Constitution of
the United States permit the transfer of American territory and other
property by treaty alone, or must such a treaty necessarily be followed by implementing legislation in order to effect a transfer?
The Constitution authorizes the President to negotiate and enter
into treaties,4 and declares such treaties to be the supreme law of the
* A.B., George Washington University; J.D., Seton Hall University Law Center;
Member, New Jersey Bar; Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service. This
article is an extensive revision of a report, dated August 4, 1977, originally written by
the author for the Congressional Research Service, and therefore no claim to copyright
is made in this material. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Congressional Research Service.
1 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
2 See U.S. Dep't of State, Text of Treaties Relating to the Panama Canal, Selected
Documents No. 6 (1977).
3 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1978, at 1, cols. 2 & 3; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1978, at
1, cols. 2 & 3; N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 4. One journalism periodical has
established a feature entitled "Panama Desk," in which all news items concerning the
Canal treaties will be indexed monthly for the convenience of its readers. See MORE:
THE MEDIA MAGAZINE, February, 1978, at 2.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This clause reads in pertinent part: "He [the
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . ..."
It has long since been recognized that the Executive has virtually exclusive control
over negotiation of international agreements. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("He alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it...").
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land. 5 However, the Constitution also grants to Congress the power
to dispose of territory and other federal property. 6 The constitutional
issue which needs to be examined, therefore, is not whether the
House of Representatives should become involved in treaty negotiation, nor whether the House should intrude upon the advice and
consent powers of the Senate. The proper issue for a discussion is
whether, by virtue of the article IV grant, Congress exercises exclusive or concurrent power over the disposal of American territory and
property. If it can be clearly resolved that the grant is concurrent,
then the Executive would be able to conclude a treaty ceding United
States territory and property in the Canal Zone without seeking implementing legislation. If it can be shown that the disposal power is
exclusive to Congress, or at least that a genuine legal question exists
regarding the nature of this power, then the constitutionality of the
treaty ceding territory and property must be doubted in the absence
of the participation of the full Congress, i.e., the House of Representatives.
After discussing the status of American sovereignty in the Canal
Zone, as well as the general scope of the treaty power, this Article
will examine the grounds on which the Executive branch has based
its claim to concurrent power over the disposal of United States territory and property. Both constitutional history and case law will be
reviewed, and American treaty practice will be examined. Ultimately it will be seen that congressional power to transfer property or territory cannot be definitely categorized as either concurrent or exclusive.
I.

THE STATUS OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY

There has been considerable debate over whether the Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal, 7 otherwise known as the
5

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The clause reads in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) (article VI, clause 2 mandates that
state law shall be nullified insofar as it conflicts with a properly executed treaty).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This clause reads in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States ....
7 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431. Later treaty modifications of the 1903 Convention have
not altered the judicially-recognized status of the Canal Zone. See General Treaty of
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Hay-Bunau-Varilla Convention of 1903, vested the United States with
complete sovereignty over the Canal and adjoining territory. By article III of the agreement
[t]he Republic of Panama grant[ed] to the United States all the
rights, power and authority within the zone . . . which the United

States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the
territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any
such sovereign rights, power or authority.8

Legal commentators have long noted the ambiguity of this language
and, in fact, both proponents9 and opponents' ° of the proposed disposal process have cited it to advance their respective positions. Despite that diversity of opinion this writer believes that one would be
hard pressed to defend a claim that the United States is sovereign in
the Canal Zone. Although the 1903 treaty provides for an extraordinary grant of rights to the United States," that grant is not complete.
Panama retains the reversionary interest held by the grantor of a determinable fee; if the United States ever ceases to use the Zone for
canal purposes, the area would automatically revert to Panama, 12 and
13
that country would then exercise all sovereign rights over the land.
Comments made by both American'

4

and Panamanian 1 5 officials

since 1903 indicate that the United States has always recognized
Panama's titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone. 16 American courts,
however, have never directly ruled on the issue of the United States'
17
sovereignty in the Canal Zone.
Friendship and Cooperation, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945 (1936); Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, [19551 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
8 33 Stat. 2235, T.S. No. 431.
9 See, e.g., Text of Statement by John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, before the Subcommittee on Panama Canal of the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 2-4 (Jan. 17, 1978).
10 See, e.g., Text of Statement by Rep. Daniel Flood, before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, reprinted in
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 61-63 (July 29, 1977).
"' See 33 Stat. 2235, T.S. No. 431.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 See 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1140-45 (1964). See also
Note, United States Sovereignty Over the Panama Canal Zone, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
250, 252-54 (1976).
15 See 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 14, at 1144-45.
6
" See id. at 1140-49.
17 Proponents of the United States' sovereignty in the Zone often cite the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907), to support their contention. In
that case, a taxpayer sued to enjoin construction of the Canal. The plaintiff premised his
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While providing a stimulating intellectual exercise, resolution of
challenge to the expenditure of public monies, in part, on the fact that the treaty with
Panama had not vested the United States with rights in the territory sufficient to satisfy
the enabling legislation enacted by Congress in 1904. 204 U.S. at 32. Rejecting the
taxpayer's contention, the Court stated that the 1903 treaty had granted the United
States valid rights in the Canal Zone territory. Id. at 32-33. The Court's decision, however, addressed the nature of title to the land held by the United States, and did not
discuss sovereignty. Id. Indeed, in Government of Canal Zone v. Coulson, 1 Canal
Zone Supreme Court Reports 50 (1907), writ dismissed, 212 U.S. 553 (1908), the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone rejected the contention that Wilson had held the Zone
to be American territory. The Canal Zone tribunal stated:
The Supreme Court did not hold more in that case [Wilson] than that the
United States had the use, occupation and control in perpetuity of the Canal
Zone. It is apparent from an examination of the treaty that the United States is
not the owner in fee of the Canal Zone, but has the use, occupation and control
of the same in perpetuity so long as they comply with the terms of the treaty
1 Canal Zone Supreme Court Reports at 55.
Other court decisions in which the territorial nature of the Canal Zone have been
adjudicated involved attempts to delineate the Zone's status for the narrow purpose of
determining the applicability of specific legislation to that area. They have not determined that the United States has sovereign status in the Zone. Luckenbach Steamship
Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 173 (1930), exemplifies these decisions.
In that case, the petitioner performed the service of transporting U.S. mail, in
American vessels, between the United States and the Canal Zone. 280 U.S. at 176. The
Postmaster General would have compensated the petitioner under a statute concerning
remuneration for mail transport between the United States and foreign ports. Id. The
General Accounting Office reduced the allowance to the petitioner, however, regarding
ports in the Canal Zone as domestic ports. Id. at 176-77. The Court did not examine the
treaty to determine the extent and scope of the grant, but instead referred to the fact
that
a long continued course of legislative and administrative action has operated to
require that the ports in the Canal Zone be regarded as foreign ports ....
Id. at 178. The Court, however, while ruling that the Canal Zone ports were to be
regarded as foreign ports for the purposes of this statute, noted that the Zone has been
considered by American courts to be both foreign and domestic, depending on the particular statute and/or issue in question. Id. at 178-83.
Other decisions, such as Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), have followed the trend set by Luckenbach. Vermilya-Brown primarily concerned application of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to construction work performed on a World War II military
base on Bermuda, portions of which were then under lease to the United States. 335
U.S. at 378-79. Arguing by analogy, the majority opinion noted that the Act might have
been applied "in the Canal Zone, adnittedly territory over which [the United States]
do[es] not have sovereignty." Id. at 381. Attacking this dicta, Justice Jackson, joined in a
dissent by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter and Burton, objected to the
comparison of leased property in Bermuda with Canal Zone territory. See id. at 402-09.
The dissent pointed out that, within the Zone, the United States was sovereign, at least
with respect to the regulation of commerce and "that the title of the United States [to
the territory was] complete and perfect." 335 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added). See also
Lucas v. Lucas, 232 F. Supp. 466 (D.C. Canal Zone 1964).
A more recent ruling declaring the Canal Zone to be "an unincorporated territory of
the United States" was made in the context of determining congressional legislative
authority over the Canal. United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 935 (1972).
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the issue of United States sovereignty in the Canal Zone is not necessary to a determination of the exclusive or concurrent nature of the
disposal power. Since the Administration recognizes that, as a matter
of domestic law, the United States holds title to land and owns property within the Canal Zone,' the transfer of such property interests
necessarily involves a disposal in article IV terms.
II.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE
SCOPE OF THE TREATY POWER

With respect to their relative status in American law, treaties
and statutes are of equal import. Both are considered the supreme
law of the land pursuant to the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 19 In the event of a conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
20
most recent is controlling.
18 The Carter Administration's view was recently affirmed in the course of an exchange during recent hearings:
The CHAIRMAN: Ambassador Bunker, do you agree with the proposition
that the United States holds a property interest in the Canal Zone?
Ambassador BUNKER: That it owns property?
The CHAIRMAN: Yes.
Ambassador BUNKER: It does own about one-third of the area of the Canal
Zone.
Hearings on the New Panama Canal Treaty Before the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977),
19 See note 5 supra.
20W hitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). The plaintiffs in Whitney were
sugar importers, suing to recover customs duties paid under protest. Id. at 191. Their
claim was based on a most-favored-nation clause in a treaty between the United States
and the Dominican Republic, the exporting country. Id. at 191-92. Although the treaty
with the Dominican Republic predated the statute authorizing the impost, id. at 193-94,
a subsequent treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and appropriate implementing legislation, permitted Hawaiian sugar to enter the United States
duty free, id. at 191. It was the plaintiffs' contention that the most-favored-nation clause
in the Dominican treaty entitled Dominican sugar to equal treatment. Id. at 192. The
Court found that the Hawaiian provision was a specially bargained-for concession, running only to the Hawaiian Islands, and that the clause in question in the Dominican
treaty was not intended to prevent such special concessions. Id. at 192-93. As an alternative rationale for rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the Court noted that the customs statute "[wa]s of.'general application," and that it was enacted subsequent to ratification of
the Dominican treaty. Id. at 193-94. When the terms of a treaty are not "self-executing,"
implementing legislation is required. Id. at 194. Such legislation is always subject to
congressional revision at a later date. Id. Treaty terms which are "self-executing" require no implementing legislation, drawing their force as law directly from the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Id. Such treaty terms are not "superior," however, to
ordinary legislative acts, and "[w]hen the two relate to the same subject . . . but . . . are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other." Id. Courts are obliged "to . ..
give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will." Id. at 195; accord, The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884) ("so far as a treaty . . . can become the
subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of [the United States], it is subject to such
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The scope of the treaty power is very broad, extending to all
matters usually considered the proper subject of negotiation and relations between nations. 2 ' Thus, treaties have addressed a wide range
of subject matter, from the political,2 2 military,2 3 and economic, 2 4 to
the cultural2 5 and scientific.2 6 Although the Constitution does not expressly impose limitations on the treaty-making power, court decisions dealing with that power have found that it is limited, at least to
the extent that a treaty may not violate the Constitution and remain
valid.2 7 Treaties have occasionally been accorded a restrictive reading

acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal"); United States
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623 (1881) (subsequent legislation "necessarily repeals the
provisions of any prior statute, or of any [prelexisting treaty, . . . clearly inconsistent
therewith"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829) (ratification of selfexecuting treaty provisions repeals all legislation "repugnant" thereto; non-selfexecuting treaty provisions require implementing legislation to accomplish same); The
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108-10 (1801) (decision of an inferior prize
court reversed on basis of treaty concluded while appeal was pending).
21 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (treaty provision suspended state law
disability of French citizens to inherit real property from United States citizens; regulation of "manner in which . . . property may be transferred, devised or inherited, are
fitting subjects [of] negotiation . . . between the two countries"); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) (treaty power vested in the President and Senate "in general terms," designed to extend to all matters traditionally viewed as "subjects of
negotiation and treaty," bounded only by limitations which inhere in the Constitution of
the United States).
22 See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Argentina, [1972] 23
U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Multilateral Convention Concerning Consular Relations,
[1963] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
23 See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, [1970] 21 U.S.T.
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
24 See, e.g., Treaty on Fisheries: Shrimp, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 923, T.I.A.S. No. 7603;
International Wheat Agreement, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 821, T.I.A.S. No. 7144.
25 See, e.g., Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural
Properties, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
26 See, e.g., Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
27 E.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (footnote omitted) ("[ilt would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution . . . to construe
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions"); Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (citations omitted) ("treaty-making power . . . does not extend
'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids' "); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
266-67 (1890) (citation omitted) (dicta that treaty power may not interfere with "character of the government or . . . that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of any
territory of the latter, without its consent"); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
616, 620-21 (1871) ("a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in
violation of that instrument"); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (when a
treaty is properly executed, "the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any
of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States").
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in order to give them effect without violating the Constitution; 2 8
however, the Supreme Court has never squarely held a treaty un29
constitutional.
Treaty obligations are themselves contractual in nature and,
therefore, become binding in an international sense once an exchange
of ratifications has occurred. 30 Thus, once the constitutional formula
for ratification has been satisfied, the United States becomes obligated to the other contracting nation or nations according to the
terms of that treaty-contract. 3 1 Although completion of this process
will finalize the compact as a matter of international law, in some
instances the agreement's effectiveness as a matter of domestic law is
not conclusively established until action is taken by the House of
Representatives. Such action, ordinarily taking the form of implementing legislation, is a function of the constitutionally mandated
dispersal of power among coordinate branches of the national government. 3 2 Therefore, when called upon to enforce treaty provisions as domestic law, American courts have found it necessary to
distinguish between international agreements which are self-executing
and those which require execution through passage of an enabling
act. 3 3 It is generally recognized that implementing legislation will be
28 See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-34 (1912) (treaty provision interpreted as not displacing state law of intestate succession).
29

J. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 83 n.28 (1975); L. HENKIN,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1975); 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
30 1

§ 309,

at 561 (1929).

W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 29, § 4, at 3. Chief Justice Marshall early noted

that "[a] treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act .
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
31 See generally 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 29, § 321, at 579.
32 The Federal Constitution, of course, mandates that distinct grants of power be
made to the legislature, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, to the executive, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
and to the judiciary, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
33 See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 156-67; Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS § 137, at 206-08 (1922). Although the practice of
distinguishing between self-executing treaties and those which are not is a long standing one, the passage of time has not simplified the task of classifying a particular treaty.
See id. § 256, at 353. Recognition of the distinction is generally credited to Chief Justice
Marshall who stated that
[o]ur Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.), 253, 314 (1829).
Foster and a subsequent case, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
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required: (1) when the terms of the treaty itself call for passage of
such an enabling act, 34 and (2) in the more undefined situation when
the treaty is considered to affect a power which the Constitution has
exclusively delegated to Congress.3 5 Those international compacts
falling outside both of these categories are considered self-executing,
that is, they are deemed effective, as a matter of domestic law, upon
36
proper ratification.
The first significant conflict between the House of Representatives and the Executive concerning the extent to which an exercise of
the treaty power may encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives
of Congress arose during the administration of George Washington.

(1833), which reconstrued the operative language of the same treaty, are illustrative of
the distinction. In Foster, the Court was required to construe a provision of the Treaty of
Florida cession which provided "that 'all the grants of land made before the 24th day of
January 1818, by his Catholic magesty [, the King of Spain,] . . . shall be ratified and
confirmed ....
" 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14. The plaintiff, whose claim was based on a
Spanish grant, sued to recover possession of a Louisiana tract, the title to which was in
dispute. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the petition, the Supreme Court held
that the treaty language did not automatically confirm all Spanish grants, but rather
constituted a contractual stipulation requiring Congress to confirm the grants by legislative act. Id. at 313-17. Although Congress had confirmed a number of Spanish grants
within the territory, the plaintiff's grant was not among them. See id.
The Percheman case also involved the validity of a title based on a Spanish grant
made prior to the cession of Florida. See 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 82-98. In that case, the
Supreme Court had before it both the English and Spanish versions of the same treaty
provision. Id. at 88. Upon examination of the text in both languages, the Court determined that the actual meaning of the language construed in Foster was "that the grants
'shall remain ratified and confirmed ... ' " Id. (emphasis added). This interpretation led
the Court to conclude that the grant had been " 'ratified and confirmed' by force of the
instrument itself." Id. at 89. As thus construed, this provision was self-executing.
34 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see Q. WRIGHT, supra note 33,
§ 137, at 206-08.
35 Q. WRIGHT, supra note 33, § 137, at 208; see L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 159-61.
Among the exclusive powers of Congress which have been suggested as possible limitations on the treaty power are: (1) the power to appropriate money from the treasury,
Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States, 18
AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65-67 (1924); (2) the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, id. at 68-69; (3) the power to govern and dispose of territory, id. at 69-70; (4) the
power to establish inferior tribunals to administer the laws of the United States, id. at
70-72; and (5) the "power 'to declare war,' " id. at 72-79. Although Professor Wright
acknowledged that treaties affecting exclusively delegated powers are not self-executing, he noted that they may impose an obligation on Congress, as a matter of international law, to respond with appropriate legislation. Q. WRIGHT, supra, § 256, at 353-56.
36 See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Q. WRIGHT, supra
note 33, § 137, at 207. Although it is often difficult to determine whether a particular
treaty will be effective without implementing legislation, as a general proposition, "provisions which define the rights and obligations of private individuals and lay down
general principles for the guidance of military, naval or administrative officials in relation thereto are usually considered self-executing." Id. at 208.
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The Jay Treaty of 179617 contained provisions requiring the United
States to indemnify Loyalists whose property had been expropriated
after the Revolutionary War. 38 Following ratification, an appropriations bill was introduced in the House to provide the means for carrying out the nation's financial obligations under the agreement. 3 9 During the course of debate, a resolution was passed requesting certain
documents from the President relating to treaty negotiations. 40 Chief
Justice Ellsworth, Alexander Hamilton, and various heads of the Executive Departments recommended that the President not furnish
the information, since, in their view, the House obligation to vote
appropriations arose from the existence of a binding treaty. 4 1 Upon
this advice, Washington refused to comply with the congressional re42
quest.
The Administration's position was attacked by Thomas Jefferson
and Albert Gallatin. They conceded that the treaty power was vested
in the President and the Senate, but argued that when the general
power of one branch conflicts with the specific power granted to
another branch, the specific power acts as a limitation on the general
power. 43 Despite their opposition, the House nevertheless passed the
particular appropriations measure. 4 4 In order to prevent its submission in this case from being interpreted as congressional acquiescence
to future exercise of the Executive's treaty power, the House also
passed a resolution asserting that, while it did not claim a right to
participate in treaty negotiation or ratification, treaties affecting a delegated power of Congress would not be domestically effective until
an enabling act was passed. 4 5 In addition, the resolution reserved to
Congress the right "to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency
of carrying such treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon
46
as in their judgment may be most conducive to the public good."
37 See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 165-71 (1916).
For discussions on the background and impact of the Jay Treaty, see J. FOSTER, A
CENTURY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: BEING A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1876, 165 (1902); C. HILL, LEADING AMERICAN TREATIES 45-59 (1922); J. LATANE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

92-93 (1927).
38See J. FOSTER, supra-note 37, at 91; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 53-54.
39 See J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 167-68; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 56-59.
40 See J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 167. See generally C. HILL, supra note 37, at 58.
41 See S. CRANDALL, supra note 37, at 167-71.
4 See id.; J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 168; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 58.
4 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771-72 (1796).
44 See E. BYRD, TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
35-59 (1960); J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 169; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 58.
45See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771, 782 (1796).
46 Id. at 782; see H.R. REP. No. 4177, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1887). The House
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This narrow and limited view of the scope of the treaty power
has long since been rejected. 47 It is now accepted that those grants of
power that are not exclusive in nature, in other words, those that
permit concurrent jurisdiction, do not require implementing legislation. 48 The Supreme Court has never issued a comprehensive opinion specifying those powers of Congress regarded as exclusive. However, it has been the practice of the Executive and Senate to seek
House consent through implementing legislation when treaties in50
volve changes in the revenue laws 49 or require appropriations.
III.

IS

THE POWER TO DISPOSE OF FEDERAL

TERRITORY AND PROPERTY EXCLUSIVE?

A.

The Constitution

Authorities remain uncertain as to whether the power to dispose
of federal territory and property is among those which may be exercised solely by Congress, or whether it may be shared with the Executive branch. The language of article IV, section 3, clause 2, from
which Congress derives the power, is permissive in form. 5 1 That
had also passed a resolution in 1871 which reaffirmed its limited right to participation
in the treaty-making process. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1871). The
resolution was couched in language virtually identical to that contained in the 1796
resolution passed at the time of debate over the Jay Treaty. Id. See also 1 W.
WILLOUGHBY, supra note 29, § 303, at 548-49; Q. WRIGHT, supra note 33, § 248, at 344.
47 See L. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 148-49, 155; 5 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1906).
48 See 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 29, § 306, at 553-55.
49 It appears that the exclusive nature of the grant concerning changes in revenue
laws is as much a matter of political expediency as constitutional necessity. See L.
HENKIN, supra note 29, at 149; 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 29, § 307, at 559. For a
general discussion of implementing legislation, see H.R. REP. No. 1569, 68th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1925).
50 See, e.g., Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (No.
14,251) (C.C. Mich. 1852); SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 91-1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 487
(1969); H.R. REP. No. 4177, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1887); 1 W. WILLOUGHBY,
supra note 29, § 304 at 549-52; S. CRANDALL, supra note 37, at 171-82.
This conclusion is apparently prompted by the fact that these grants are couched in
mandatory language. Thus, the revenue grant reads in pertinent part, "All Bills for raisU.S. CONST. art. 1,
ing Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives ....
§ 7, cl. 1, while the appropriations grant reads "No Money shall be drawn from the
U.S. CONST. art. I,
Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law..
§ 9, cl. 7.
Interestingly, House conferees noted in 1815 that they believed, and that their
counterparts in the Senate agreed, that all treaties "requiring appropriations, or which
might bind the nation to lay taxes, to raise armies, to support navies, to grant subsidies,
to create States, or to cede territory" required implementing legislation. 29 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1019 (1816).
51The article reads in pertinent part:
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wording has been advanced for the proposition that the power may
be exercised concurrently in treaty matters. Despite such language,
the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that congressional power
to dispose of federal territory and property is exclusive. 52 Since those
decisions involved dispositions of property within the federal system,
however, the rulings do not clarify whether the disposal clause may
properly be considered as a limitation on the extent of the Executive's treaty power. Although the scope of article IV remains
unsettled, 5 3 precedent does exist on which to base an argument that

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The permissive "shall have" is contrasted with the more
mandatory language used in the appropriations and revenue grants. See note 50 supra.
52 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (article IV, section 3 vests in Congress the power of
disposition of the lands of the United States and that power is unlimited); Alabama v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (power to dispose of any kind of property belonging to
the United States is vested in Congress without limitation and the propriety of a disposition of such property is not subject to judicial review); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 164, 193 (1853) (power to dispose of federal territories, given to Congress, has
only such limitations as are expressed in the section in which the power is given);
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537-38 (1840) (power over the public
lands is vested in Congress by the Constitution, without limitation, and the disposal of
those lands must be left to the discretion of Congress); American Insurance v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (power to govern territory as a consequence of the right
of Congress to acquire it); Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 (1810) (Congress
has the absolute and undisputed power of governing and legislating for the territory of
Orleans).
In a 1924 advisory opinion, Attorney General (later to be Chief Justice) Harlan
Stone agreed "that property once acquired by the Government [could] not be sold, or
title otherwise disposed of, except under the authority of Congress ..
" 34 Op. ATT'Y
GEN. 320, 322 (1924) (quoting from United States v. Nicoll, 27 F. Cas. 149, 150
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 15,879)). But cf. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 247
(1872) ("there are many authorities where it is held that a treaty may convey a good title
to [federally-owned property] without an act of Congress").
-3 Indeed, proponents of the new treaties assert that article IV is devoted to the
distribution of authority between federal and state governments and does not pertain to
the disposal of federal property by treaty to a foreign nation. See Hearings on Treaties
Affecting the Operations of the Panama Canal Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, [hereinafter cited as Panama
Canal Treaty Negotiations] 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 15 (1971-1972) (statement of Carl
F. Salans, deputy legal adviser, Department of State); id. at 97 (statement of Ralph E.
Erickson, deputy attorney general); Text of Opinion Letter of Attorney General Griffin
Bell to the Secretary of State 12 (Aug. 11, 1977); Text of Statement by Herbert J. Hansel1 , legal adviser, Department of State, before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation
of Power of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concerning the Transfer by Treaty
of Property Belonging to the United States 5 (July 29, 1977).
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the disposal clause was intended to limit Executive treaty-making
power.
It has been urged that the records of the Constitutional Convention and of the state ratifying conventions demonstrate that the fram54
ers intended the treaty power not be limited by the disposal clause.
While such a conclusion may be drawn from a cursory reading of the
debates at those sessions, a close analysis of the proceedings on a
day-by-day basis permits one, at the very least, to challenge the certainty with which that conclusion has been expressed.
The records of the Constitutional Convention indicate that the
delegates either defeated, or did not vote on, motions that would
have required involvement of the House of Representatives in the
formal treaty process itself, or would have required legislative enactment of all treaties. 5 5 Insofar as the treaty power was perceived to
involve the power to cede American territory, however, delegates
voiced especial concern. As in the later state ratifying conventions,
many delegates were dismayed by the prospect of the President and
two-thirds of a quorum in the Senate being empowered to effect a
56
cession of land without approval of the more representative House.
It must be viewed as significant that one of our prime sources of
information as to the events of the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison, insisted at the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the treaty
clause could not incorporate the disposal power. 57 Thus, although the
issue of territorial disposal through exercise of the treaty power was
recognized by the framers, it was perhaps their intention that no definite resolution to this problem be supplied in the language of the
58
Constitution itself.
54 See Text of Statement by Griffin Bell, Attorney General of the United States,
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Panama Canal Treaty 6-8 (Sept.
29, 1977); Text of Statement by Herbert J. Hansell, supra note 53, at 62-7.
55 See II M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 392-94, 538,
540-41, 543, 547-49 (1911).
56 See S. CRANDALL, supra note 37, at 221; II M. FARRAND, supra note 59, at 143,
169, 183, 196-97, 297-98, 392-95, 538-43, 547-49; 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 26-29, 124-35, 263-79 (1836).
57 See 3 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 61, at 514-15. Madison apparently felt that the dis-

posal power could, at least theoretically, lead to dissolution of the Union, an act not
meant to be within the power of the governmental branches. He stated:
I do not conceive that power is given to the President and Senate to dismember
the empire, or to alienate any great, essential right. I do not think the whole
legislative authority have this power. The exercise of the power must be consistent with the object of the delegation.
Id 58 Madison himself suggested
that the full Congress participate in treaty conclusion
on an ad hoc basis:
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The significance of the debates and events at the Constitutional
and state ratifying conventions have elsewhere been debated by wellrespected legal scholars. 59 That such distinguished members of the
legal profession can draw opposite conclusions after analyzing the
same materials seems in and of itself sufficient evidence for recognizing the lack of clarity expressed by the Founding Fathers on the subject of the nature of the disposal power.
The Federalist Papers provide further contradictory evidence on
this issue. James Madison therein categorized the powers conferred
on the federal government by the subject-matter to which they
related. 60 These powers were divided into six categories. 6 1 Madison
discussed the disposal
power in a class of powers he termed as
"miscellaneous.- 6 2 If the disposal clause was meant to have been
considered only in a federal-state context, it would have been logical for
The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations and is
external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such
external regulations would be necessary. Would it be right to define all the
cases in which Congress could exercise this authority? The definition might,
and probably would, be defective. They might be restrained by such a definition, from exercising the authority where it would be essential to the interest
and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise.
Id. (emphasis added).
59 Exemplifying this controversy are the disagreements between Dr. Raoul Berger
and Dean Louis Pollack. See 124 CONG. REC. S1414 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (memorandum of Raoul Berger); 124 CONG. REc. S729 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978) (paper of Dean
Louis Pollack, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School); Text of Statement by Raoul Berger
before the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries 3-4, 12-16 (Jan. 18, 1978). See also Text of Statement by Prof.
Scot Powe, Georgetown Univ. Law School, before the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries 4-8 (Jan. 18, 1978); Text of Statement by Prof. Charles E. Rice,
Univ. of Notre Dame Law School, before the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries 4-5 (Jan. 18, 1978).
Several other noted educators have commented on various aspects of the proposed
treaties. See Text of Statement by Prof. R. R. Baxter, Harvard Law School, before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Jan. 19, 1978); Text of Statement by Richard
Falk, Princeton Univ., before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Jan. 19,
1978); Text of Statement by Prof. Covey T. Oliver, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School,
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Jan. 19, 1978).
60 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41-44, at 256 (J. Madison) (McLean ed., New Amer.
Lib. pub. 1961).
61 Id. Madison's categories were: (1) national defense and security; (2) regulation of
relations with foreign nations; (3) promotion of harmony and proper intercourse among
the states; (4) miscellaneous powers; (5) restrictions on state authority; and (6) provisions giving efficacy to the first five categories of power.
62 See id. No. 43, at 274 (J. Madison). But see id. No. 81, at 480 (A. Hamilton)
(federal [judicial] jurisdiction should cover matters involving treaties since latter "have
an evident connection with the preservation of the national peace").
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Madison to discuss that grant among the powers listed in category
three (promotion of harmony and proper intercourse among the
states), or in category five (restrictions on state authority). 63 It is in
these sections that Madison discusses the rationale for reserving certain powers to the states, while granting others exclusively to the
federal government. Yet, the disposal clause is nowhere mentioned in
these categories. Thus, the Federalist Papers provide some support,
although by implication, for questioning the proposition that the disposal power was only to be considered in controversies between the
federal and state governments. Yet even this assertion is subject to
doubt. 64
It does not appear, then, that there is any clear answer to be
obtained from constitutional history itself as to the exclusive or concurrent nature of the article IV grant as it relates to the disposal of
property to a foreign power. Therefore, the past treaty practice of the
United States will be explored in order to determine if that practice
reveals precedent that may be considered controlling.
63 See id. No. 42, at 267-71 (J. Madison); id. No. 44 (J. Madison).
64 Id. No. 43, at 274 (J. Madison). Madison's discussion of article IV, section 3,
clause 2 was very brief. The entire text of the discussion reads:
This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former [last cited miscellaneous
power]. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered
absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.
Id. By "the former," Madison was apparently speaking of the power to create and admit
new states contained in clause 1 of article IV, section 3. See id. at 273-74. Of that
provision Madison says the following:
In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important
subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of
the United States; and the other Colonies, by which were evidently meant and
other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of New States seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that
instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assump-

tion of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety,
therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that
no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority,
and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to
govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new
States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the
larger States; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a
junction of States without their consent.
Id. Since this latter discussion does not concern international relations, nor the treaty
power, the fact that Madison cross-references his remarks on the disposal power to it is
perhaps the strongest support available for an argument that the disposal grant was not
meant to circumscribe exercise of the treaty power.
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Treaty Practice
Treaties Involving Boundary Claims

On numerous occasions in its history, the United States has concluded treaties with foreign powers to adjust or locate its borders.
These boundary treaties are often cited to support the proposition
that federal lands have, in the past, been ceded by self-executing
treaty.6 5 Examination of these agreements and the events which led
up to them show, however, that they are distinguishable from the
proposed Canal pacts. These boundary treaties did not involve a disposal of American property since the territory which was the subject
of discussion was genuinely in dispute. 66 Those treaties did not involve an actual cession of territory so much as they established recognized boundaries across territories where title was uncertain.
In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, both Great Britain and
the United States made concessions on claims to some twelve thou67
sand square miles of land on the Maine/New Brunswick boundary.
This border had been ill-defined by the treaty ending the Revolutionary War, and subsequently became the subject of a dispute with
intense feeling on both sides as to the legitimacy of their respective
claims. 68 Each country possessed a map which supported the position
of the other; this factor motivated the parties to settle the controversy
by negotiation. 6 9 After ratification of the treaty, it was learned that the

65 See, e.g., Text
Statement by Herbert
66 See notes 67-95
67See J. FOSTER,

of Statement by Griffin Bell, supra note 54, at 10-11; Text of
J. Hansell, supra note 53, at 10-11.
infra and accompanying text.
supra note 37, at 282-83; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 177-82; J.

LATANE, supra note 37, at 208-09; T. PATTERSON, J. CLIFFORD & K. HAGAN, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 102-03 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as T. PATTERSON].
68 See J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 282; C. HILL, supra note 37, at 178-79; J.
LATANE, supra note 37, at 208; T. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 101. Perhaps the most

notable incident to occur as a result of tensions over settlement of a border was the
so-called "Aroostook War." In the late 1830's, large numbers of British settlers and lumberjacks encamped along the Aroostook River following an announcement that English
authorities planned to build a railroad through a portion of the disputed territory. J.
LATANE, supra at 209; T. PATTERSON, supra at 101. Maine officials demanded that the
British leave and both sides subsequently sent troops to the scene. J. LATANE, supra at
209; T. PATTERSON, supra at 101. Armed conflict was averted, however, when a temporary truce was negotiated pending resolution of the conflicting boundary claims. J.
LATANE, supra at 209; T. PATTERSON, supra at 101. Despite the serious effect this confrontation had on American-British relations at the time, the "Aroostook War" in fact
ended on a tragi-comical note with the sole American fatality occurring "when a Maine
militiaman accidentally killed a comrade while firing his musket in celebration of
peace." T. PATTERSON, supra at 101.
69 See J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 214-15; 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF
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United States had, in fact, ceded to Britain land to which it had a
70
colorable, if disputed claim.
The Webster-Ashburton agreement is of limited precedential
value for purposes of establishing whether disposal of territory may
be accomplished by self-executing treaty. The territory which was the
subject of the Northeast boundary dispute in 1842 differs from the
Canal Zone property in two significant respects. First, since the territory in question was claimed to be within the State of Maine, the
United States was negotiating over state, not federal, lands. The Congress, in fact, later appropriated money compensating Maine for its
loss. 7 1 Second, the territory on the Northeastern border was, in 1842,
subject to real dispute between the United States and Great Britain.
Although it seems clear that the United States is not sovereign in the
Canal Zone, it appears equally clear that this government owns land
and other property in the Zone.
Britain and the United States found themselves engaged in a
similar dispute some three years later over the Oregon territory in
the Northwest. 72 That matter, however, distinctively involved federal
territory rather than land claimed by an individual state. 73 The disputed land occupied a range from the forty-second parallel to fiftyfour degrees, forty minutes, the southern boundary of Russian possessions in Alaska. 74 This territory was jointly occupied by Britain and
the United States pursuant to a treaty which had been originally concluded in 1818. 75 As a result of political developments in the United
States, 7 6 interest intensified in finalizing an exact boundary. Despite
Democratic rhetoric during the presidential campaign of 1844, to the
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES
PARTY 154-57 (1898); T. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103.
70 See T. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103.
71 5

HAS BEEN A

Stat. 623, ch. 89. Since the cession antedated the appropriation, it may not be

claimed that the appropriation served as implementing legislation. This incident is
nevertheless distinguishable for the reasons stated.
72 See J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 306-13; J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 230-34; T.
PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103-05.
73 While the State of Maine had especial interest in the Webster-Ashburton negotiations, viewing the dispute as one affecting its own borders, no individual state was
particularly concerned or affected by the conflicting claims to the Oregon territory. See
J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 306-07; J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 229-31; T. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103-04.
74 J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 304-05.
75 Id. at 304; J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 227. See generally C. HILL, supra note
37, at 136-49.
76 Indeed, a plank of the Democratic presidential platform of 1844 called for American occupation of the entire Oregon territory. J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 230-31; T.
PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103.
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effect that the United States should press its claim to the entire territory in dispute, American negotiators had repeatedly proposed the
forty-ninth parallel as a settlement boundary. 77 Shortly after the election of President Polk, the British Government summarily rejected
such a proposal, prompting the President to withdraw all settlement
offers and take action preliminary to ending joint occupation of the
Oregon tract. 78 Interestingly enough, this action took the form of requesting approval from both the Senate and the House of Representatives to withdraw from the treaty of 1818. 79 In addition to granting
the Executive's request by joint resolution, however, both houses of
Congress noted that the measure was being passed with a view toward
renewing attempts to resolve this particular dispute through negotiation. 80 The Oregon matter, then, is also distinguishable from the situation in Panama insofar as (1) a genuine dispute as to boundaries
existed, and (2) the President in fact sought approval from both houses
of Congress before acting with respect to the subject property.
It has also been urged that the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 is an
81
example of a cession of American territory by self-executing treaty.
That agreement, cited by Attorney General Griffin Bell in an opinion
letter to the Secretary of State,8 2 provided for American acquisition of
Spain's Florida holdings in return for a relinquishment of this country's possible claims to Texas. 83 The Attorney General concludes that
congressional debate and a presidential message regarding this treaty
"made it clear that many considered the action to be an outright
cession of American territory in exchange for Spanish territory." 84
The congressional debates noted by Attorney General Bell occurred in April of 1820 and were apparently sparked by two resolutions submitted by Henry Clay, an opponent of the treaty. 8 5 The first
resolution would have affirmed the exclusive power of Congress as
it related to the disposal of territory and property. 8 6 The second expressed the view that, because of the exclusiveness of the disposal
77See J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 306-07; T. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 103.
78 J.FOSTER, supra note 37, at 307-08; J. LATANE, sutpra note 37, at 232-34.
79J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 307-08; J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 232-33.
80 See J. LATANE, supra note 37, at 234.
81

See, e.g., Text of Opinion Letter by Attorney General Griffin Bell, supra note 53,

at 16-17.
82 J.

83 See C. HILL, supra note 37, at 167-69; J. FOSTER, supra note 37, at 261; J.
LATANE,

supra note 37, at 118-19; T.

PATTERSON,

svipra note 67, at 93.

84 Text of Opinion Letter of Attorney General Griffin Bell, supra note 53, at 16-17.
85

See generally T.

86

36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1770-73 (1820).

PATTERSON,

supra note 67, at 94.
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power, lands west of the Florida Territory-Texas-should not be
ceded by treaty regardless of how uncertain this country's claim
might be. 8 7 One of the few members of Congress to speak against
these proposals based his argument, not on any refutation of the
congressional claim over the disposal power, but on the assertion
that the Texas property had not been, and was not then, American
territory. "There is no pretence [sic] for sustaining the resolutions,"
said Representative Anderson of Kentucky, "until it is first shown
that Texas belongs to us .... ."8 He continued:
The history of the [Louisiana Purchase] shows, that the ownership of this province has never ceased to be a question ...
Spain has never agreed that it belonged to us.
89
We have never had possession.

Anderson commented that a debate over the relationship between the treaty power and the disposal power would be unnecessary
since this particular treaty was clearly within the treaty power. 90 He
then noted that further congressional action on the treaty would be

purposeless since it had already been submitted to the House for approval, and since a relevant enabling act had been passed in March,
1819.91 In light of this fact, the presidential message cited by Attorney General Bell can be seen more as an exercise in "sabre-rattling"
than as a convincing statement of America's claim to the Texas territory. In that message, dated December 7, 1819, President Monroe
expressed outrage at the failure of the Spanish government to ratify
the Adams-Onis agreement which had been signed by the United
States and Spain the previous February. 9 2 Making a thinly-veiled
threat of unilateral action if Spanish ratification was not shortly forthcoming, Monroe sought to emphasize that the United States had
made a real sacrifice in reaching a negotiated settlement. 9 3 In this
context he stated that in return for the Spanish possessions in Florida
"other territory of great value, to which our claim was
believed
well-founded, was ceded by the United States. ' 94 Under the circumstances, transfer of America's possible claim to the Texas lands seems

87Id. at 1771-73.
8
Id. at 1771-72.
89 Id.
90Id.
91Id.; see Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 93, 3 Stat. 523.
92 2 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 622-24 (1897).

93Id. at 623-24.
94h. (emphasis added).
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less than convincing precedent for establishing the concurrent nature
of the power to dispose of territory and property. Instances of boundary resolution, then, do not seem to provide support for the proposition that the treaty-making power extends so far as to include the
power to dispose of United States territory and property without im95
plementing legislation.
IV.

TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES

It has been contended that the practice of conveying land to
Indian tribes by treaty during the nineteenth century supports the
proposition that implementing legislation is not necessary in order to
convey territory and property in the Canal Zone to Panama. 96 Conveyances to the Indian tribes appear to be distinguishable for several reasons.
First, the status of the Indian in American law is both unique
and complex. Two views regarding Indian status have existed simultaneously since the founding of our government. One view recognizes
that the Indians comprise a distinct people, the equivalent of nations,
who could be dealt with by treaty. 9 7 The second view considers the
Indians to be dependent political communities, wards of the nation,
or in a state of pupilage to the United States. 98 Reflective of the
ascendancy of this latter view was the passage, in 1872, of the Indian
Appropriations Act 9 9 by which the federal government repudiated the
practice of dealing with the Indians under the treaty power. 100
95 One noted commentator has suggested that international agreements dealing with
the settlement of disputed boundary lines be considered "not as . . . treat[ies] of cession, but of recognition." S. CRANDALL, supra note 37, at 226.
96 See, e.g., Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, supra note 53, at 97; Text of Statement by Attorney General Griffin Bell, supra note 54, at 9; Text of Statement by Herbert J. Hansell, legal adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 7-8 (Jan. 17, 1978); Text of Statement by John M. Harmon,
assistant attorney general, supra note 9, at 13-14.
97 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
98 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (relationship to United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian which became more appropriate as they grew more dependent).
The views expressed in Worcester and Jones existed concurrently. See, for example,
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas By., 135 U.S. 641, 654 (1890) wherein it was stated:
It is true, as declared in Worcester . . . that the treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate the Indian Territory as completely separated from the States
and the Cherokee Nations as a distinct community . . . [b]ut neither these nor
any previous treaties evinced any intention, upon the part of the government, to
discharge them from their condition of pupilage or dependency, and constitute
them as separate, sovereign people, with no superior within its limits.
99 16 Stat. 544, ch. 120.
0) 16 Stat. 544, 566. The Act stated that Indian tribes would not be recognized as
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Additionally, the nature of the interests conveyed to the Indians
in agreements with the United States concluded prior to 1872 varied.
In some cases, the United States only recognized a right to continued
occupancy and use of' certain lands; in other cases, the United States
granted, by treaty, a fee simple interest.101 It is interesting to note
that many nineteenth century grants to the Indians by treaty were

authorized by legislation. 102 Even when the Indian tribes were
granted land in fee, however, their interest in that land was no more
extensive than the interest of any other fee simple owner of land in
the United States. 10 3 Moreover, at least one authority has com-

mented that in most of the treaty grants to the Indians the United
States retained a higher interest than
10 4
domain.

a mere right of eminent

It can be seen, therefore, that the interests conveyed by the
United States did not amount to a full cession of property as is contemplated by the proposed Canal treaties. It may be argued that the
mere fact that these disposals occurred without House involvement is
sufficient to deny the exclusivity of the disposal power. However,
since the Indians were dependent, political communities, analogies
between improper disposals within the federal system and disposals

by treaty to a fillv independent sovereign, such as Panama, seem
specious.

independent nations "with whom the United States ma\ contract by treats.." 16 Stat.
566. The debate surrounding passage of' that provision was intense. Members of the
House vigorously asserted that the power to dispose of territor\ was vested exclusively
in Congress, and that the treaty power did not encompass the authority to cede land.
See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 764, 766-67, 1811-12, 1821-25 (1871). Since the
Act received the blessings of a majority of both Houses, and was signed by the President, it would appear that the Honse, Senate and President all concurred in that belief.
101 See United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R., 314 U.S. 339, 345, 347 (1941); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903); Jones v. \leehan, 175 U.S. 1, 23 (1899); L.
SCHMECKEBIER, TtiE OFFICE OF lN1IIAN AFFAIRS 5-6 (1927).

102 For instance, article III of the Treaty of New Echota (Cherokee Treaty of Dec.
29, 1835), 7 Stat. 478, 480 states
that the lands above ceded by the Treaty of Feb. 14, 1833, including the outlet,
and those ceded by this treaty shall be included in one patent executed to the
Cherokee nation of' Indians by the President of the United States according to
the provisions of the Act of' May 28, 1830.
The Act of Mas 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, provided that the President could exchange certain federal lands west of the N ississippi River with the Indian tribes in
return for lands in which they previously lived. 4 Stat. 412.
13 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 655-59 (1890).
104 See L. SCHMECKEBIER, supro note 101, at 5-6. The Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 33,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 137, originally passed in 1790 and currently codified at 25 U.S.C. 177 (1970),
limits the situations iin which Indians can transfer tribal lands to those where the grant
is effected "by a treaty or conventions entered into pursuant to the Coiistitution.'"
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OTHER TRANSFERS BY TREATY AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Beyond the historically remote exercises of the disposal power
reviewed above, there exist more contemporary examples of Executive property transfer which seem to support the proposition that
property may be disposed of by treaty, but are distinguishable.
A.

The Mexican Treaties
The State Department has suggested that the Mexican Boundary
Treaties of 1933, 1963 and 1970 disposed of federal territory without
congressional authorization, 10 5 and thus should be considered as
precedent for the proposed transfers to Panama. The transfers of territory in these boundary adjustments were necessitated by changes
in the course of the Rio Grande. However, much, if not all of the

land transferred by these treaties seems not to have been federal
property. 10 6 Indeed, each of the treaties with Mexico required the
United States government to obtain the lands necessary for im-

10
plementation of the agreements from their non-federal owners.

7

Since these treaties did not dispose of federal property, or the disposals came about only pursuant to specific pieces of legislation, they
do not appear to support arguments which favor the concurrent nature of the disposal power.
B.

The Lend-Lease Program

Perhaps the best known property transfer occurring to date in
this century is the Lend-Lease program, effectuated between the
United States and Great Britain prior to this country's entry into

World War II. Under that agreement, President Roosevelt sent ships
105See Hearings on the Panama Canal Treaties Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., Exec. N, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (Comm. Print 1977) (letter from Herbert Hansell, legal adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
106 Id.
107 Article VII of the 1933 treaty, for example, stated that the lands to pass from one
nation to the other "shall be acquired in full ownership by the Government in whose
territory said lands are at the present time." 48 Stat. 1621, T.S. No. 864.
Likewise, section 1 of the American-Mexican Boundary Convention Act of 1964,
22 U.S.C. §§ 277d-17 to -25 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) provided statutory authorization for
the acquisition of "all lands required (1) for transfer to Mexico as provided in said convention." Article I(d) of the 1970 treaty provided that "[o]nce this Treaty has come into
force and the necessary legislation has been enacted for carrying it out," both governments would determine the necessity for "[t]he acquisition, in conformity with its laws,
of the lands to be transferred to the other." [1972] 23 U.S.T. 377, T.I.A.S. No. 7313.
Such legislation was later enacted. See American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of
1972, 86 Stat. 1161.
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and other material to England in exchange for rights in various
British territories. 108
Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson supplied the President
with a formal opinion finding legislative authorization for the disposal
of property solely by Executive agreement. 10 9 Although Jackson offered several arguments in support of Presidential power to enter the
Lend-Lease agreements, the most persuasive was simply that the
President's independent action, in this case, was an appropriate exercise of his military powers as commander-in-chief given the deteriorating " 'world conditions.' "110 Insofar as the transfer thus took
place outside the scope of treaty power considerations, it is inapplicable to the present question.
C.

The Reversion of Okinawa and the Swan Islands
A more recent transfer of territory and property in which the
United States had an interest was the 1972 restoration of the Daito
and Ryukyu Islands, of which Okinawa is the largest, to Japan. The
transfer' 1 ' was accomplished under the treaty power and was, therefore, never submitted to the House. This transfer did not involve a
cession of American territory since the nature of the interest relinquished was administrative rather than territorial. 112 The official State
Department position was that since the islands had never been
American territory, their reversion could not amount to a territorial
cession. 113
The Okinawa treaty did, however, convey a good deal of federal
property to Japan in the form of structures erected on these islands
108 See

generallyj D. DEENER, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1957).
109See D. DEENER, supra note 108, at 286-87.
110 D. DEENER, su pra note 108, at 286.

GENERAL AND

"I Agreement concerning Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands,
[1972] 23 U.S.T. 446, T.I.A.S. No. 7314.
112 The testimony of Secretary of State Rogers, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, expressed the State Department's understanding that Japan had, at all
times, retained " 'residual sovereignty' "' over the islands and that the term
was clearly designed to convey to Japan and to the world that although the
United States was obliged to retain control of the Ryukyus temporarily for security reasons, what had been Japanese territory was not being permanently
detached from Japan and the principle of no U.S. territorial acquisitions as a
result of war was being observed.
Remarks of Hon. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, reprinted ill 92 CONG. REC.
40371 (1971).
113 See id. See also Burna v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Va. 1956), aff'd,
240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1957); United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.
Hawaii 1954).
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by the United States government. Although it is possible to argue
that legislative support for this property transfer may be found in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or The Federal Surplus Property Act
of 1949,114 it seems more likely that the treaty disposal was not based
on implementing legislation.
The 1971 treaty1 15 between the United States and Honduras
provides another example of a disposal of property without apparent
congressional authorization. The treaty recognized the sovereignty
of Honduras over, and disposed of some property on, the Swan
Islands. 116 Although once of interest to the United States for their
guano deposits, 1 17 these Caribbean keys have been used since the
very early portion of this century only as a weather and observation
station." 8 With the Honduran government recognizing that the
United States will continue to use the land and retain title to the
property necessary for the operation of this facility, this disposal has
aroused little controversy.1 19
114 Current legislative authorization for transfer of American property to foreign nations by the Executive may be found in Title IV (Foreign Excess Property) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 511-514 (1970).
These sections authorize the disposal of foreign excess property by executive agencies.
In addition, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), authorize the President
to transmit, under certain conditions, defense articles and services to other countries.
115 Treaty on the Swan Islands, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 2631, T.I.A.S. No. 7453.
116Id. at 2631, T.I.A.S. No. 7453.
117 In fact, American claims to the islands were based on the Guano Islands Act of
1856, 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (1970), which essentially provided for annexation, "at the discretion of the President," of "any island, rock, or key" discovered by a United States
citizen, and unclaimed by any foreign power, on which there was "a deposit of
guano--guano being the excrement of various sea fowl.
118 See S.R. No. 92-24, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). The islands were described in
this manner:
The Swan Islands are rock keys located in the Caribbean about 98 miles off
the coast of Honduras. The islands have no intrinsic value to the United States
and the largest of the two islands is only two miles long and one-half mile
wide. The only U.S. interest in these islands is the operation and maintenance
of a meteorological observation and telecommunications facility and an air
navigation beacon. The islands are populated by approximately six Americans
who operate the facilities and a dozen Honduran nationals and British subjects
who work for the United States facilities or raise cattle.
Id. Thus, this treaty would seem distinguishable from the Canal agreements due to the
de minimus nature of the property transferred under the fomer.
119When the Swan Island treaties were submitted to the Senate for consideration,
Senator Mike Mansfield made the following comment: "It is my understanding that all
these treaties were reported on unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations.
I know of no opposition to any of them." 118 CONG. REC. 20041 (daily ed. June 7,
1972).
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VI.

PAST PRACTICE REGARDING DISPOSAL OF
U.S. PROPERTY IN THE CANAL ZONE

A brief examination of previous cessions of property to Panama
reveals that both the Executive, and the Senate, have considered it
necessary to obtain the consent of the House before carrying out such
disposals. In 1932, for example, Congress passed a bill enabling the
United States to construct a new building for its legation in the Canal
Zone. 1 20 Since it was technically impermissible to build a legation
structure on territory under American jurisdiction, 1 21 the State Department had drafted the bill by which Congress would authorize the
Secretary of State to modify the boundary line between Panama and
the Canal Zone so as to temporarily cede a tract of land back to
Panama. 122 In this manner, the legation could be built on "Panama123
nian territory.'
Similarly, in 1942, the Senate debated whether to approve, by
joint resolution, an Executive Agreement transferring certain land
and property in the Canal Zone to Panama.' 2 4 One of the most acrimonious points of debate concerned whether the transfer should
have been effected by treaty, requiring only the consent of the Senate, rather than by Executive Agreement, which required consent of
the House as well.' 2 5 The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee noted that House authorization would have to be obtained. 126 He stated that
the joint resolution has to be passed by the Congress sooner or
later in some form, for the simple reason that under the Constitution of the United States, Congress alone can vest title to property
which belongs to the United States. . . . So, if we had a formal
treaty before us and if it should be ratified, it still would be necessary for the Congress to pass an act vesting in the Republic of

Panama the title to the particular tracts of land; because "the Congress" means both bodies. The House of Representatives has a
right to a voice as to whether any transfer of real estate or other
27
property shall be made either under treaty or otherwise.1
120 Act of May 3, 1932, ch. 162, 47 Stat. 145.
121 See 72 CONG. REC. 4652-57 (1932).

Id.
Id.
124 See S.J. Res. 162, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); 88 CONG. REC. 9266-87, 9320-28
122
123

(1942).
125 See 88 CONG. REC. 9266-87, 9320-28 (1942).
126 See note 127 infra and accolnpanying text.
127 88 CONG. REC. 9267 (1942).
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The transfer was ultimately approved by the Senate. 128 Other
relevant dispositions may be seen to have been made, however, with
9
full congressional approval.12
VII.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the treaty making power, vested in the President to be exercised with the advice and consent of the Senate, is
extremely broad in scope. 130 That power is limited when the Constitution confers an exclusive grant of authority on Congress. 131 Although there are excellent arguments in favor of the proposition that
the authority to dispose of federal property is concurrent and may
therefore be exercised under the treaty making power,' 3 2 those ar33
guments are not free from doubt.1
128

Id. at 9328. That transfer was also approved by the House in 1943. The House

Foreign Affairs Committee noted in its report on H. J. RES. 14, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943), that congressional approval was necessary because of the mandate of article IV
of the Constitution, H.R. REP. No. 78-271, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1943).
129 For example, the Act of July 10, 1937 authorized the Panama Railroad Co. to sell
certain lands and release reversionary interests in those lands. 50 Stat. 511. Article V of
a 1955 treaty with Panama, for example, authorized the transfer of certain real property
to that country. See [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2273, 2278, T.I.A.S. No. 3297. Part of the transfer
was to be immediate, while part was to remain dependent upon congressional authorization. See id. A State Department representative, testifying at hearings on the agreement, admitted that legislation would be needed to effect the transfer of all the territory
and property dealt with in the treaty. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the Panama Treaty, Exec. F., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-61 (1955). Authorizing legislation discussed property conveyed in all three Articles. Act of Aug. 30, 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-223, 71 Stat. 509.
130 See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
131 See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
132 See note 59 supra.
133 The House of Representatives has historically asserted its right to participate in
the disposition of territory and property by treaty. Committee hearings and reports, as
well as the floor debates, reflect that view.
For instance, in February of 1816, House managers sought to explain the differences between Senate and House conferees on a bill concerning the regulation of commerce between Britain and the United States. In their report, they noted some areas of
apparent agreement. While the House did not claim that implementing legislation was
necessary for most treaties, the Senate appeared
to acknowledge the necessity of legislative enactment to carry into execution
all treaties which contain stipulations requiring appropriations, or which might
bind the nation to lay taxes, to raise armies, to support navies, to grant subsidies, to create States, or to cede territory; if indeed this power exists in the government at all.
29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1019 (1816). In May of 1868, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported on a proposed treaty with Russia. The Committee stated that the House
had the power to determine whether a treaty exceeded the scope of the treaty power. If
it was found to exceed that scope, the House
would be justified not merely in withoutholding its aid, but in giving notice to
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A majority of the House of Representatives supports the concept
of House involvement in the disposal process. 134 By acknowledging
the necessity of House involvement, the Senate would provide the
most powerful precedent to date supporting the exclusive nature of
the disposal power. The potential ramifications of such precedent are
great. As the decades go by, we may find that a firm determination of
the exclusive or concurrent nature of the disposal power will transcend in importance the cession of property in the Canal Zone to
Panama.
foreign nations interested that it would not be regarded as binding upon the
nation, in passing laws for its abrogation, and preparing the state for whatever
consequences might attend its action.
H.R. REP. No. 37, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1868).
134 See H. Con. Res. 348, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 9, 1977). The text of the resolution provides:
That it is the sense of the Congress of the United States that any right to, title
to, or interest in the property of the United States Government agencies in the
Panama Canal Zone or any real property and improvements thereon located in
the zone should not be conveyed, relinquished, or otherwise disposed of to any
foreign government without specific authorization of such conveyance, relinquishment, or other disposition by an Act of Congress.
As of the date this Article goes to press, the resolution has 230 sponsors-a majority of
the House of Representatives.

